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1 INTRODUCTION
While most of the world has found ways to prevent
famine, Africa still has not.' But, learning from its
own experiences is at least as important for Africa as
adapting lessons from other continents. Not only
does the context of famine differ between Africa and
other parts of the world, but the conditions that
breed famine within Africa are constantly changing.
Africa's transforming economic and political sys-
tems, wars and civil unrest, declining productivity,
and rapid urbanization, as well as their interaction
with each other and with environmental variables,
all create new famine risks. As a result, simple
explanations and general theories of famine and
easy solutions remain elusive.
The systematic empirical study of famines is rela-
tively recent in origin, especially in Africa. It was
only in the early 1980s with the publication of Pov-
erty and Famines (Sen 1981) that analysis of famine
events received a more comprehensive theoretical
foundation through explicit integration of house-
hold and market relationships and of the role of
public action to support 'entitlements'. But, debate
over concepts that are only partially elaborated con-
tinues. Conventional wisdom still has it that ending
wars will end famine, that food supply has little
bearing on food insecurity, that lowering popula-
tion growth will increase food availability for all,
and that optimal early warning of famine will pre-
vent famine. These simplistic propositions will only
be overcome when empirical analyses are driven by
more clearly defined theories that expand the fron-
tiers of our understanding and feed back into con-
crete actions.
By following that route, the story will become more,
rather than less, complex. Famine risk today is not
only a function of market and production failure but
also of institutional and policy failure. Institutional
capabilities and the capacity of policy to respond in
a timely manner to crises are essential to prevent
famine. Thus, the study of famine must integrate
institutional, political, market, and production
spheres, at both macro- and micro-levels.
The most important institution at the micro-level -
the household, with its complex internal organiza-
tion and diverse macro-level linkages - must figure
prominently in the study of famine, especially where
state institutional capabilities remain weak. How-
ever, the failure of public action must not lead to
advocacy for reliance on household 'coping', the
cost of which usually includes suffering (Webb 1993).
Famine risks posed by a 'weak state' and limitations
for market-based private action suggest a continued
need for improving the role of public action (Teklu,
von Braun,and Zaki 1991; Webb, von Braun and
Yohannes 1992, Drèze and Sen 1990).
The failure of households to cope with crises is
closely linked to an absence of a legal framework to
protect personal security. The issue of security has
often been neglected or treated as exogenous by
development economists. Yet, it is a serious issue of
political economy that lies at the heart of an effective
famine prevention strategy. African famines are not
explainable as short-term crisis events; they are more
a function of long-term secular trends resulting from
a failure of policy to deal appropriately with demo-
graphic, environmental, productivity, and political
pressures, all of which make segments of society and
regions highly vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Wars
and civil unrest may become partially endogenous
to these determinants of vulnerability over time.
Optimal strategies for famine prevention must, there-
fore, build on a recognition that institutions and
their policies play a key role, and that long-term
forces are as relevant as short-term forces.
While conditions may differ from country to coun-
try, some generalizations must be attempted. This
article is too short to provide the proper context for
a full fact-oriented study of institutional, produc-
tion, market, consumption, and nutrition responses
before, during, and after famines as a basis for
recommending policy action. Rather, this article
addresses some conceptual issues that have impor-
tant policy implications and draws on selected ex-
amples from more detailed studies published else-
where.2
I The authors wish to thank Rajul Pandya-Lorch for her excellent 2 This article builds on detailed studies in Sudan and Ethiopia (see
editorial assistance during the preparation of this article. Teklu; von Braun and Zaki 1991; Webb, von Braun and Yohannes
1992; von Braun 1991; Webb and Reardon 1992).
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2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR TODAY'S
FAMINES
Unless a very high level of abstraction is chosen, a
theory of famine must relate to long-term historical
and institutional factors coupled with disasters that
are location and time specific. A general theory of
famine, therefore, has its limitations. Keeping this in
mind, Sen's (1981) theory of entitlement failures
remains the most comprehensive general theory of
famines to date.
Before discussing the conceptual framework, a few
definitional clarifications are in order. A clear dis-
tinction needs to be made between famine,
undernutrition, and hunger (including seasonal
hunger). Hunger, largely an advocacy rather than a
scientific term, is defined here as an individual's
inability to eat sufficient food to lead a healthy and
active life. It is a recurring feature of absolute
poverty, especially in developing countries. Sea-
sonal hunger is often observed in rural areas during
preharvest seasons when food stocks are depleted
and seasonal prices are high.
Undernutrition represents nutrient deficiencies in a
diet leading to illness (lack of energy, retardation, or
blindness) and even death. The symptoms them-
selves may not be recognized as indications of nutri-
ent deficiencies since interactions between
undernutrition and diseases are complex.
Famine is widespread and extreme hunger that re-
sults in drastic loss of body weight, increase in
morbidity, and (as an interaction of these two symp-
toms) a rise in death rate. Massive social dysfunction
and dislocation are important community-level
symptoms. The causes can be traced to shortage of
food or inaccessibility to available food because of
drought, natural disaster, political (war) or eco-
nomic disruption, or massive income collapse asso-
ciated with disruptions in factor (labour) or product
(food) markets. Most frequently, famines result
from complex combinations of these factors. Fam-
ines are mainly rural events that often occur in areas
characterized by chronic undernutrition.
Figure 1: Determinants of and Relationships in Famines
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Figure 1 attempts to delineate relationships between
root causes and symptoms of famine events. Pov-
erty, including the associated vulnerability to natu-
ral or man-made shocks, is a root cause of famine.
Yet, poverty and its dynamics may be seen as an
endogenous outcome of lack of resources and flawed
policies. Endogenous and exogenous relationships
are conceptualized at different levels of analysis.
The figure depicts broad interactions between policy
failures, resource poverty and disaster, and the popu-
lation transition process. Cause-and-effect relation-
ships are then distinguished with some of the more
important nonexhaustive indications of feedback
mechanisms between the four levels of analysis.
1 The top layer represents economic strategy and
policy interacting with social discrimination,
conflicts, and wars; resource endowments and
their relationship to climate or disaster events
influencing levels of poverty and instability of
the (food) system; and population growth. Little
comprehensive research exists on interactions
between these three basic clusters in contributing
to famines.
2 The second layer relates to policy interventions,
such as subsidies and distributional policies, that
influence input/output relationships such as
production levels and stability.
3 The third layer depicts policy interventions inter-
acting with price formation and linkages be-
tween capital, labour, and output markets.
4 The last layer relates to actual income and con-
sumption failure, and resulting starvation and
excess mortality, interacting with the collapse of
services and distress migration. It is at this level
of analysis that the failure of 'entitlements' be-
comes evident.
Much of the controversy over 'the' theory of famine
appears to result from a selective focus on individual
layers of the analysis, which leads to communication
problems between different scholars of famine (see,
for example, exchanges between de Waal (1990) and
Osmani (1991)). Conceptual and analytical discus-
sion on any one of the four layers can be pursued as
long as upstream and downstream linkages be-
tween the layers remain in perspective.
3 POLICY FAILURE
Policy failures are arguably among the most impor-
tant root causes of today's famines. Deficiencies in
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public policies are frequently associated with, and
highlighted by, low agricultural productivity; exten-
sive environmental degradation partly because poor
households lacking alternative production technolo-
gies are forced to mine resources to survive in the
short term; lack of rural and urban nonagricultural
employment opportunities, which limits nonfarm
incomes; limited access to education; and poor health
and sanitation conditions. Resulting socioeconomic
conditions impair the ability of households to grow
out of poverty, thereby permitting production fail-
ures caused by drought to develop into famines.
Inappropriate macroeconomic policies and exces-
sive state interference in economic activity can exac-
erbate inherent food insecurity, as evident from the
experiences of Sudan and Ethiopia. Exchange rate
regulations and export taxes historically have ad-
versely affected rural economies in these countries,
not only by undermining general rural growth pros-
pects but also by impacting directly on specific
communities. An example of a misguided policy
comes from Sudan where gum arabic, the product of
an environmentally friendly export crop grown in
the famine-prone provinces of Darfur and Kordofan,
was excessively taxed (von Braun 1991).
Policy failures are also revealed in domestic dis-
crimination (ethnic conflicts) and in the protracted
wars of southern Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozam-
bique, and Somalia. The impact of armed conflicts is
felt not only in the areas of conflict, but throughout
the economy due to the drain on national resources.
Production and employment opportunities are lost,
making populations more vulnerable to food crises.
The massive exploitation of resources during war
has a devastating long-run effect on national recon-
structionby undermining the already limited growth
potential of today's famine-prone countries. Some
conflicts are not independent of economic strategies
pursued by governments, such as the 'Stalinist' eco-
nomic policies pursued by the former government
of Ethiopia. Effective national, regional, and inter-
national mechanisms for conflict prevention and
resolution would go a long way toward famine
prevention.
4 RESOURCE POVERTY AND CLIMATE
SHOCKS
The middle column in Figure 1 (Section B) traces -
among other things - drought-famine links, which
remain highly relevant in Africa. The agricultural
production environment is under increased stress
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from drought. In some famine-prone countries such
as Sudan and Ethiopia, food consumption is closely
related to domestic production, which in turn is
closely linked to rainfall. Analysis shows that a 10
per cent decline in rainfall below the long-term
average results in a 4.4 per cent fall in national
production in Ethiopia (Webb, von Braun and
Yohannes 1992) and in a 5 per cent fall in national
production in Sudan (Teklu, von Braun and Zaki
1991).
Yet, a single year of drought rarely causes famine.
Drought and other climatic shocks are powerful
determinants of famine only if they impact on coun-
tries with limited resource bases (for example, those
that have been undermined by war) and with a lack
of preparedness due to deficient policies (indicated
downstream in Figure 1). Some famine-prone re-
gions do have inherent resource poverty problems,
such as certain regions of Ethiopia and Sudan's Red
Sea Hills. However, many others, such as Sudan's
southern regions, do not have such problems. Long-
term deterioration of the resource base contributes
to the vulnerability of the local population.
5 POPULATION TRANSITION
Most of Africa's famine-prone countries have very
high and even increasing population growth rates
and rapidly growing labour forces. The transition
from high birth rates/high mortality to low birth
rates/low mortality is delayed by famine events,
low economic development, deficient health serv-
ices, insecurity, and underinvestment in education.
Thus, there are strong links from policy failure and
resource poverty to the nature and speed of the
population transition, as indicated in the top layer of
Figure 1. Furthermore, the negative feedbacks from
distress migration by famine refugees and from
related population concentrations are not only symp-
toms of current famine stress, but they also provide
the foundation for future vulnerability.
6 MARKET FAILURE
In times of emerging food shortages, the behaviour
of food, asset, and labour markets is critical in deter-
mining famine outcomes, particularly for the abso-
lute poor. It is crucial that policymakers have a
comprehensive understanding of market and price
behaviour during food crises. The literature on
market behaviour during famines in Africa remains
limited compared with related work in Asia. Crises
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are characterized by increased entry of the poor into
the market for purchases of food and sale of assets
and labour. Where markets are thin and transaction
costs are high (due to poor infrastructure and policy
restrictions on interregional trade), and public
stabilization is weak (due to low food reserves and
limited capacity for importing), price fluctuations
tend to be large. Such price movements have a
relatively greater effect on the poor. In Sudan, for
example, when the decline in rainfall during 1984/
85 precipitated a drop in cereal production, cereal
prices doubled in major regional markets. This
caused dramatic deteriorations in the terms of trade
for livestock and cash crops, unusually large sea-
sonal price swings, and sizeable price differentials
between regions. Some remote rural markets broke
down as rural demands for food declined in the face
of collapsing nominal incomes and increasing prices
(Teklu, von Braun and Zaki 1991).
Food prices alone neither send appropriate signals
to private traders nor can they be the guiding yard-
stick for public intervention. Transaction costs (in-
cluding market risk) and the purchasing power of
the poor require attention, too. Basic infrastructure
deficiencies and government trade restrictions im-
pair interregional market exchange during famine
years. A sudden collapse of purchasing power - in
the context of production failure and a parallel
decline in employment opportunities - may not
force sharp price rises in an affected region, because
of a fall in effective demand. The potential for
'relying on the market' to mitigate famine in regions
or countries suffering from consecutive famines be-
comes increasingly limited because the asset bases of
most households is eroded.
Lack of infrastructure - rural roads, transportation
facilities, and the like - make a market-oriented
response to local or regional food scarcity and an
efficient public and private famine relief response
very difficult. Similarly, lack of integrated markets
due to poor roads and marketing policies that are
often state-controlled impair incentives for farmers.
Prohibitions in domestic trading are prevalent and
prevent market integration during times of drought.
Ethiopia, for instance, has experienced more
regionally concentrated severe shortages than Su-
dan, where market integration in cereals existed,
which spread scarcity widely, affecting the poor in
all parts of the country (Webb, von Braun and
Yohannes 1992).
7 HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL PERSPECTIVES
Famine symptoms at household and individual lev-
els represent a failure to cope with the processes
depicted in layers (1), (2), and (3) of Figure 1. The
literature on the impact of famine and on the means
adopted by households to minimize that impact has
become increasingly complementary and conver-
gent. While conditions vary by locality, there are
identifiable behaviour patterns associated with the
onset, progression, and climax of a crisis. These
responses are largely determined by the nature of the
crisis, its speed, intensity, and linearity, as well as by
the varying abilities of different households to cope.
This variability in coping capacity is widely believed
to hold the key to an effective design of famine early
warning systems and appropriate interventions
(Torry 1988).
The close relationship between food production,
food prices, wages, and employment is critical when
looking at household responses to famine. House-
holds can respond to fluctuations in food produc-
tion, prices, and wages by adjusting consumption,
income, or savings. On the consumption side, house-
holds can adjust their consumption of food and
nonfood items. On the income side, households can
adjust their cropping patterns, intensify work in off-
farm activities, or compound their incomes through
remittances or food aid.
The pattern of household responses to a food crisis
generally involves a succession of stages along a
continuum of 'coping' that runs from long-term risk
minimization through crisis damage containment to
the extreme instance of household collapse. These
stages can be grouped under three headings: risk
minimization, risk absorption, and, if necessary,
risk-taking to survive.
The first stage - risk minimization - involves insuring
against risk in a precrisis period in an environment
of limited credit and insurance markets. It incorpo-
rates measures of savings, investments, accumula-
tion, and diversification. There are four key ele-
ments to this strategy: (1) protect minimum produc-
tivity through intercropping, spatial dispersal of
fields, using multiple seed varieties, holding of mixed-
species herds, and preserving last-resort grazing
grounds; (2) accumulate assets through food stor-
age, capital accumulation, and investments in valu-
able disposable goods such as jewellery, farm equip-
ment, and housing goods; (3) expand credit through
establishment of social support networks based on
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gifts, sharing of food, and loan provision; and (4)
diversify the income base to include nonfarm sources
(and migration remittances). The extent to which
households are successful in pursuing and attaining
these goals plays a large role in determining the
outcome of subsequent crises.
The second stage of coping - risk absorption - in-
volves divesting earlier investments, calling in loans,
and searching for new credit. As capital for invest-
ment dries up, consumption of both food and
nonfood is restricted, stores of food are drawn down,
and the variety of potential income sources become
crucial to survival. The ability to protect past invest-
ments declines. Access to credit to stabilize con-
sumption and limit distress sales of assets is crucial
at this stage for a quick recovery from food crises. Of
course, capacity for coping is not solely a function of
the asset base; it is also a function of human capital
accumulation. For instance, in Sudan, rural children
whose parents had some formal education, and
especially those children whose mothers had re-
ceived some schooling, had significantly better nu-
tritional status than other children following the
1985 famine (Teklu, von Braun and Zaki 1991).
The final stage in coping, which may become ines-
capable if conditions persist in the absence of exter-
nal aid, involves the disengagement of all normal
systems of survival. At this point, the diet of most
households is dominated by unusual 'famine foods'
(roots, leaves, rodents), and they are obliged to sell
their remaining assets. If they are still able to do so,
many households break up and leave their resi-
dences in search of assistance from distant relatives
or at relief camps.
This sequence of events depicts a scale of increasing
irreversibility of actions taken, and of increasing
vulnerability to any continuation of the crisis. It also
assumes the worst; each response, at best, delays the
onset of the next stage, unless conditions change or
external help arrives. Not all of the coping actions
undertaken by households at each stage of the crisis
are beneficial, either to the households or to the
environment. Reducing basic food intake to mini-
mal levels or breaking up a family to enhance the
chances of survival of individual members does
entail suffering. Similarly, desperate actions such as
cultivation of marginal land or wholesale felling of
trees to sell as firewood have serious consequences
for future environmental conditions and income
generation.
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